


# Secure Multiparty Computation in the Internet of Things

Marcel von Maltitz  
vonmaltitz@net.in.tum.de  
<http://www.net.in.tum.de/members/maltitz>





A Siemens building management system in Vienna, which can access some 10,000 sensors, provides extremely energy-efficient lighting, as well as temperature and ventilation optimization.








©Siemens

HVAC  
Lighting  
Elevators






Power Consumption  
Presence Detection  
Environment Sensing


Fire Safety  
Guidance Systems  
Energy Management

Data providers



Data consumers






© General Electrics: Predix Platform

Data providers

Data consumers





## Security

- Collection of raw data
- History of previously collected data
- → Single point of attack, High value target




## Privacy / Data Protection

- Personally identifiable/relatable information
- Collection and usage intransparent
- Lost of control
- Observation / Tracking / Surveillance
- → Threats to privacy
- → User acceptance?
- → Legal conformity?

Data providers


Data consumers






Data providers

Data consumers



There are  $n$  parties  $P_1, \dots, P_n$ . Each party  $P_i$  holds a secret value  $x_i$ . *Secure Computation* of  $y = f(x_1, \dots, x_n)$  is performed if two conditions are satisfied:

- Correctness: the correct value of  $y$  is computed
- Privacy:  $y$  is the *only* new information that is released



Example: Addition

Party	$x_i$	Share $P_1$	Share $P_2$	Share $P_3$
$P_1$	10	3	2	5
$P_2$	5	1	2	2
$P_3$	7	4	1	2
Result	22	8	5	9

## Confidentiality

- Raw input data only on collecting device

## Unlinkability

- Results give no insights in input data
- Illegitimate combination of information from same device harder

## Transparency

- Purpose of computation known due to participation
- Trustworthy accountability by individual parties

## Intervenability

- Parties can refrain from participation → Veto-Mechanism

## Dynamic Environment


- Parties previously unknown
- Subsets of Parties
- Different input data
- Computations previously unknown

## Orchestration of Computations

- Synchronized communication
- No error handling
- Only parties obtain result

## Service character


- Access for data consumers
- Metadata about available information
- Access control



## SMC Gateway

Data providers


Data consumers



## SMC Gateway


Data providers

Data consumers




# Approach: Self-organizing Parties

SMC Peer



- Bonjour / Zeroconf
- Find GW with matching properties / responsibility
- Match capabilities
- x509 certs commissioning
- Out-of-bound verification
- Request verification
- Preprocessing with selectors
- Synchronized start of SMC
- Check for problems
- (Signed) result sent to GW




von Maltitz, M., Smarzly, S., Kinkelin, H., & Carle, G. (2018). A Management Framework for Secure Multiparty Computation in Dynamic Environments. To appear in Proceedings of NOMS 2018 -- IEEE/IFIP DOMINOS Workshop. Taipei, Taiwan.



## SMC Gateway

Data providers


Data consumers



## SMC Gateway

Data providers

Data consumers



## Secure Multiparty Computation in the Internet of Things

- Promising approach
- Solves/mitigates several security and privacy problems in systems handling sensor data
- Challenges emerge from mismatch between SMC premises and properties of dynamic environments
- Convergence possible

